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SUBJECT: Comments on Soviet Naval Threat to 1978

### Introduction

While Soviet surface forces are of post-war construction, about 50 percent of this force, built before 1957, has limited capabilities in the environment of 1969.

We view as a major weakness the lack of logistic support for the surface forces. Without such support, long-range, combat operations can only be of short duration.

We do not yet see firm evidence of a trend pointing toward development of carrier task forces or long range amphibious assault capabilities.

### Surface Attack Capabilities and Limitations

The surface element of the anti-task force concept did consist of ships with long-range surface-to-surface missiles--Kynda, Krupnyy, and Kildin. However, Soviet strategy shifted, as indicated in the Atlantic summer exercise of 1967, to a reliance on the E and J classes of submarines. Moreover, Kresta, as a redesign of Kynda with a 75 percent reduction in SS-N-3 missile capacity, uses this system for defense against surface attack. The Soviets clearly regard Kresta as an anti-submarine ship. Kashin similarly is regarded as an ASW ship. Since 1965 the Soviets have concentrated test firings for the SS-N-3 missile in the 100-200 nm range.

### Moskva-Class Helicopter Carriers

There is relatively strong evidence Moskva has a low frequency, powerful, hull mounted sonar. Leningrad now is operating in the Black Sea.

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### Future Force Levels

We estimate new DLG/DDG will have considerably improved sonar and ASW weapons above current classes.

### Antisubmarine Warfare

We do not view the slowness of Soviet ASW as an enigma. The program has had high priority. However, development has been slow because of the complexity of the problem. Almost certainly the helicopter cruisers will prove to be effective additions to Soviet ASW forces, although there are only two of them. We estimate that the helicopter dipping sonar apparently is passive and possibly bistatic with Moskva's hull mounted sonar.

### Amphibious Assault

We believe the evidence does not support the use of Moskva as an amphibious assault command ship or for vertical assault. However, we agree the ship could support amphibious operations and could transport some troops to an undefended location ashore.

### Summary

We believe the main thrust of Soviet strategy for long range operations is the destruction of carrier forces with emphasis on missile air defense in their major ships. The Soviets probably do not view aircraft carriers as a prime deficiency.

### Table 7

We believe the ranges for MBU weapons, MBU 2,500 through MBU 4,500 A are in error. New, accurate information indicates that MBU 2,500 A has a range of 6,700 yards (6,000 meters). We do not believe torpedo E40-63A exists and estimate that the weapon on Petya and Mirka is the E-40-65A. An air dropped version of this latter torpedo may exist.

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